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reality of food, famine, and superiority in what food 
anthropologist Sidney Mintz termed “the single most 
powerful instrument of dietary change in human 
experience”: war (1996, p. 25). In Tasting Food, Tasting 
Freedom (1996), Sidney Mintz outlines the processes by 
which a society learns to “consume food differently,” 
(p. 17); that is, how to integrate different foods, how to 
prepare them differently, how the contexts in which we eat 
may change, and how the purposes for which we eat can be 
changed. War, Mintz notes, greatly changes the eating 
habits of a community or nation.
The purpose of this work is to explore the historical 
significance of soldier rations and mentalities about food as 
it pertains to feeding and supplying an armed force.2 This is 
an exploratory paper using a few carefully selected 
examples to suggest connections to current scholarly 
thinking about foodways which can be enriched through 
closer study. Three main elements of military food supply 
will be examined: 1) what food was deemed acceptable by 
each force, as determined by the generals or heads of 
military; 2) how the ability to supply such food worked; 
and 3) what effects these choices and methods of 
distribution may have had upon soldiers and their ways of 
thinking about the food they ate. The intention is to use 
these matters to illustrate how food, in wartime, is power.
During a military campaign, both civilians and soldiers 
are expected to serve the needs of the nation in different 
ways. Soldiers and the resources to feed them, the 
foodstuffs themselves, cooking paraphernalia and expertise 
to make a proper meal, must be mobilized. As Sidney 
Mintz (1996) notes,
Large numbers of persons are assembled to do things 
together — ultimately, to kill together. While 
learning how, they must eat together. Armies travel 
on their stomach; generals — and now economists 
and nutritionists — decide what to put in them. 
They must do so while depending on the national 
economy and those who run it to supply them with 
what they prescribe or, rather, they prescribe what 
they are told they can rely upon having (p. 25).
In previous conflicts, such as the First Northern War 
between Sweden and Denmark-Norway (1563–70), the 
Swedish government experienced massive troubles both 
raising the number of soldiers needed and keeping them 
properly supplied. The army typically lived off the land, 
taking contributions from the local populations where they 
marched. The official statement to these people was, in 
essence, that the army “wished to do [the peasants] no 
And after all, you do at least get decent food out 
there, so I hear.
– All Quiet on the Western Front 
(Remarque 1982, p. 166).
Abstract: There is a reason they say an army marches on 
its stomach. Well-fed soldiers fight better than starving 
ones, but until the modern era, it was a great logistical 
problem to provide reliable food and resources to an army 
on the march. The Great Northern War (1700–1721) was a 
conflict in which an alliance led by Peter the Great, Tsar of 
Russia, challenged the supremacy of the Swedish Empire; 
at that time, Sweden’s territories almost encircled the 
Baltic. At stake were territories which would allow Russia 
to gain a port on the Baltic Sea, giving Russia access to 
European trade. Also, the King of Denmark, Frederick IV, 
wanted to reclaim traditionally Danish lands in Southern 
Sweden, and the Polish-Lithuanian monarch, Augustus II, 
wanted to take Livonia from the Swedish Empire in order 
to solidify his crown as a hereditary kingship, thereby 
granting him more power and authority. This war is also 
notable for the use of more modern methods to supply the 
army beyond looting the land: Sweden, bolstered in the 
early part of the war by an allotment system begun by 
Charles XI, had comparatively large peacetime rations for 
its serving men. It remained in use for the next 200 years.
Although there is keen interest in the military history of 
many conflicts, the Great Northern War (1700–1721) is 
relatively uncharted in terms of food history, despite its 
ability to make visible the limits of the possible logistics of 
supply for early warfare in a European context. The images 
that emerge from current research typically focus on the 
leadership and military strategies of Charles XII of Sweden 
and Peter I of Russia and the aftermath of the war,1 which 
toppled Sweden from its position of power and established 
Russia as the dominant force in the Baltic. In this paper, 
soldiers’ diaries, letters, and other historical accounts show 
that in the early part of the war, Sweden set a high standard 
for feeding its troops, which in part led them to awe-
inspiring victories against their enemies. In the later years 
of the conflict, food shortages and destruction of the land 
were key strategies in Russia’s effort to wrest the upper 
hand from an enemy which seemed unbeatable.
This study will frame these elements in terms of 
contemporary European mentalities toward food and 
warfare. Analysis of these materials will demonstrate the 
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25,000 infantry and 11,500 cavalry soldiers raised by the 
rotar as part of the allotment system. A further 22,000 foot 
soldiers and 8,500 cavalry were contracted by the crown 
(Oakley 1992, p. 104). Ongoing conflict in the Baltic 
region during much of the seventeenth century had helped 
to turn Swedish soldiers into a highly trained militia whose 
early success was undercut in the later years of the Great 
Northern War by supply shortages and famine, among 
other factors (Parrott 2012, p. 99).
With these advantages, the Swedish army could afford 
to set a high standard for the care and feeding of its men. 
The ideal ration prescribed for the Swedish troops in 1700 
included a considerable amount of fat and protein: 625 
grams of dry bread, 850 grams of butter or pork, one-third 
liter of peas and 2.5 liters of weak beer for each soldier 
(Åberg and Göransson 1976, pp. 26–7). In July 1718, near 
the end of the Great Northern War, the listed ration for 
each soldier in the Hälsingland regiment similarly included 
637 grams of bread, 1/3 liter of groats (gryn), 283 grams of 
meat and 16 grams of salt, as well as some brandy and 
tobacco. Men overseeing the rationing and distribution of 
wages noted that the rations were “quite abundant,” 
although the prescribed 170 grams of butter or pork was 
missing (Norrby 1980, p. 81). This regiment occupied the 
relatively peaceful Trondelag region in Norway at the time, 
and so can be expected to have had better access to food 
and critical supplies.
This gives us a general picture of both what was 
significant to the Swedish troops and what they could, or 
thought they could, rely upon having: bread, dried peas or 
groats, meat or butter, alcohol in the form of beer or 
possibly brandy, tobacco and a bit of salt. Bread has long 
been a staple in the diets of the civilized West. Bread wheat 
is known to have evolved by 8000 BCE and archaeological 
remains of leavened bread as we know it date back to 4000 
BCE in Egypt (McGee 2004, p. 517). As far back as the 8th 
century BCE, Homer used the word sitòfagoi (“bread-
eaters”) as a term synonymous with “men” in his writing 
(Montanari and Brombert 2015, p. 54); and indeed, from 
the diary examples discussed herein, “bread” is often 
synonymous with “food.” Albrecht von Wallenstein, a 
military leader in the Thirty Years’ War, once wrote that 
his army needed bread, then munitions, and finally wages, 
in that order (Hummelsberger 1986, p. 62; Parrott 2012, 
p. 196). Bread was given to soldiers throughout history 
because of its portability, tradition and bread’s position in 
diet as a daily necessity. In this period, every soldier 
required bread and 680 grams per day was typical. To provide 
bread for a force of some 30,000, a week’s supply of flour, and 
the wood and ovens required to bake it could require 250 carts 
(Parker pp. 75–6). During the Great Northern War, a diary 
entry from Second Lieutenant Robert Petrés dated April 13, 
1704 comments that Chief Lieutenant Leuwenhaupt ordered 
300 horses to drive in provisions but the enemy had already 
overtaken 30 to 40 men at the task, leaving no more than 
two alive. Upon learning of the attacks, Leuwenhaupt 
harm, but leave them safe in their houses with their families, 
and protect them from all violence and desire or take 
nothing from them apart from these contributions, and 
necessary fodder and food” (Bienemann 1902, pp. 8, 15–16). 
The contribution to gain such noble treatment by the army 
was set at eight lod of silver per household (Frost 2000, p.75).
At the Diet of 1682, King Charles XI announced that 
he would raise provisional infantry regiments of 1,200 men 
and asked how such recruits would be provided.3 The 
Peasant Estate made their preference for the knektehåll, 
(contract) clear. In exchange for peasant farmers banding 
together, usually in a rota of 2 full-value farms, to provide 
the necessary wages and supplies for one soldier per rota 
(e.g. wages, clothing, and housing), the farmer, his family 
and servants were exempt from the traditional conscription 
which was used to raise a fighting force. This tactic for 
raising manpower had been used in 45 of the 60 years 
before 1679, having profound effects on the communities 
the recruits were pulled from. In the example of one 
Swedish parish, 236 men were conscripted in sixteen levies 
between 1620 and 1639, and almost all died in combat. 
This “radically altered the demographic profile of the 
parish,” almost halving the number of men between the 
ages of fifteen and sixty (Lindegren 1980, pp. 144–77; see 
also: Frost 2000, p. 205). In addition to the heavy toll of 
warfare on the population, conscription could create deep 
resentment within the community. Large segments of 
society, including merchants or artisans, were often 
exempted. Luard (1992) notes, “[i]t was generally believed 
that recruits should be drawn from the classes of the lowest 
social value, including criminals” (p. 39). As a result, 
conscription was an ineffective way to raise an army. In 
1627, when more than 300 soldiers were conscripted from 
Kronoberg County in southern Sweden during war with 
Poland, only 60 men appeared on the appointed day 
(Nelsson 1993, p. 13). The rota also received tax incentives 
for agreeing to support soldiers in this way and the king 
was guaranteed a large, easily mobile force at far less cost to 
his own Treasury. When the soldiers were not needed, they 
would work the farms which provided their income, 
contributing to the wellbeing of the farm in another way. 
The community thus banded together to provide an army 
to protect the interests of the state, rather than being 
strongly encouraged to contribute money or supplies in 
exchange for dubious promises of safety.
By instituting the allotment system, the Swedish crown 
was able to maintain a professional army (Upton 1998, 
pp. 73–8; Derry 2000, pp. 152–3). It also made the 
Swedish army one of the largest in Europe and one of the 
few which did not depend largely on mercenaries or 
conscripted soldiers (Nelsson 1993, p. 46). Moreover, they 
could be mobilized quickly in times of war, saving weeks 
which would normally be spent on calling men to serve or 
scouring the Treasury for money to pay mercenaries, under 
the old system.4 At the start of the Great Northern War, 
Sweden had an army totaling approximately 67,000 men: 
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However, rations could not be counted on in the field in 
the same way they could be during peacetime or when 
occupying relatively stable regions. Against the high rate of 
attrition, Charles XII’s insistence on marching into Russia 
and the enemy attacks on their relief forces and supplies, 
the allotment system was not enough. Following their 
stunning victory at Narva in 1700 against a much larger 
Russian force, by 1702 one regiment was so “poorly 
provided with uniforms and provisions” (Höglund 1996, 
p. 48) that they had to be placed in Reval in the Baltic 
provinces. In August of 1708, Charles led his troops into 
Russian territory, where they faced Peter the Great’s forces, 
which were stationed between the Soja and the Dnieper. 
Waliszewski (2013) comments that “they were driven to 
support themselves by gathering ears of corn, which they 
ground between two stones. Sickness began to thin their 
ranks. Their three doctors, so the fierce troopers said, were 
‘brandy, garlic, and death’!” (p. 391). By this time, diaries 
frequently mention that “the army had long suffered from a 
shortage of bread” (Petrés 1902, p. xxv). By September 
1708, the Russians had destroyed the landscape around 
their enemy in an effort to keep the Swedish from finding 
food or supplies on the march. A diary entry by Lieutenant 
Joachim Matthiæ Lyth from September 28 comments,
Under this march through the forest, we lost many 
men and many horses, which died of hunger, so that 
our misery grew ever greater; we had to watch as 
both men and horses alike, exhausted by hunger, 
dropped to the ground and died there miserably; so 
it remained for us doubly worse (Lyth 1903, 
pp. 60–1; Frost 2000, p. 286).
Reinforcements led by Swedish general Lewenhaupt met 
Charles’s force in October of 1708, but they had been 
defeated by engagements with the Russians on the way, and 
the relief rations and artillery they carried was lost. 
However, the diary of a Second Lieutenant reveals 
brennevin5 and tobacco were brought out to the men by 
General Major Lagercrona, likely to bolster their morale 
(Petrés 1902, pp. 183–4). The taste of tobacco and the 
comfort of brennevin may well have been emblems of 
everyday life to the soldiers, much like Coca-Cola was to 
the soldiers of World War II. In 1942, when supplies of the 
soft drink were threatened by sugar rationing of that time, 
one letter from January 1942 pleaded with a local bottler to 
keep producing the beloved beverage: “Very few people 
ever stopped to consider the great part Coca-Cola plays in 
the building and the maintenance of morale among 
military personnel” (Pendergrast 2013, p. 185; Mintz 
1996, pp. 25–32). Back in the Ukraine and on the march, 
thousands of soldiers ultimately starved or froze to death, 
though the war was far from over (Höglund 1996, p. 5). 
The inability of the Swedish government to provide food 
for its troops was a microcosm of the larger problems of the 
war and any advantage the allotment system provided them 
was quickly spent.
abandoned whatever provisions and livestock had already 
been collected to make a quick escape (Petrés 1902, p. 19) 
reflecting a time-honored military strategy of hitting the 
enemy where it hurts most: the food supply.
As another often-mentioned ration, the benefits of 
alcoholic beverages to soldiers in combat are myriad. In 
general, beer was thought to be highly nutritious, as the 
malting process “raised the caloric value of the base cereal, 
giving beer more calories than bread made with an 
equivalent amount of grain” (Phillips 2014, p. 37). In 
addition, it was rich in carbohydrates, vitamins, and 
proteins, and gave the drinker a pleasant feeling. The daily 
ration could be drunk without interfering with one’s work, 
making it excellent for hydration. Indeed, British medical 
officer John Bell, who served in the seventeenth century, 
regarded beer as an “invigorating, antiseptic, salutary 
beverage […] highly nutritive” for soldiers (Phillips 2014, 
p. 276). Keegan (1978) states,
The prospect of battle […] seems always to alarm men’s 
anxieties, however young and vigorous they be, rather 
than excite their anticipation. Hence the drinking 
which seems an inseparable part both of preparation 
for battle and combat itself. Alcohol, as we know, 
depresses the self-protective reflexes, and so induces 
the appearance and feeling of courage (p. 326).
The importance of a ready supply of bread and alcohol, 
in particular, is clear as far back as Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 
composed around 8 AD. The three daughters of a priest of 
Apollo named Anius were able to change everything they 
touched into bread, wine or oil. Lines 790–799 relate that 
Agamemnon heard of their gifts and demanded they feed 
the Greek army, under threat of war (Ovid 2010, p. 371). 
Anius also had a son whose gift was to prophecy the future, 
but apparently this was not as valuable a skill to the 
military leader as producing food.
Considered in this light, food can be seen as central to a 
soldier’s survival and identity as a civilized person of 
Western culture. Additionally, the way any given group 
eats helps assert its hierarchy and organization, and at the 
same time, both its togetherness and the otherness of 
whoever eats differently. Food is central to individual 
identity, in that any given individual is in part constructed, 
biologically, psychologically and socially by the food 
culture he/she is a part of (Fischler 1988, p. 275). Sidney 
Mintz (1996) comments that the ability to supply an army 
properly is itself a show of power,
not only because it may include some ability to 
bestow meaning, but also because meaning 
coalesces around certain relationships. Objects, 
ideas and persons take on a patterned structural 
unity in the creation of ritual, […] But it was the 
purveyors of the foods, the givers of employment, 
the servants of the state, who exercised the power 
that made the foods available (p. 30–31).
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animals (e.g. horses, dogs) and finally to cannibalism in an 
attempt to survive8, though there is no evidence that the 
Swedish army did so in this conflict. Sweden and its army 
were deeply Christian at this time,9 and the Church had 
longstanding rules regarding the eating of certain flesh.10 It 
is unclear whether or not the Swedish soldiers might have 
broken this taboo in an attempt to survive, if records of such 
acts were lost, or if cold and disease killed them too quickly 
to try. It is clear the situation became direr over time. In 
1716, remarks on the general muster were depressing, as 
most men were without uniforms, and “ammunitions and 
bread wagons the same” (Höglund 1996, p. 57).
Carolean soldiers were much more likely to desert the 
camp or otherwise try to escape in times of hardship. A 
member of the Dalarna Regiment, Jonas Wallberg, was one 
of men who surrendered to Russia after the disastrous 
Battle of Poltava. His diary describes prison rations as a 
quarter barrel of flour, some grouts and a palm of salt per 
month for each prisoner. After two years of this, he names 
food as the motivation for multiple escape attempts, 
despite the heavy consequences for his actions:
me, 4 under officers and 1 corporal decided to 
escape. We had walked 12 miles when we reached a 
village and to avoid famine we tried to beg for food 
in Russian. A young farmer revealed us to the 
villagers as Swedish refugees and they rang a bell 
calling in all the surrounding farmers who came 
running with spears and sticks. They arrested us 
and beat us badly. The next day they escorted us 
back to the prison camp at Ziroda. There, Colonel 
Rickman ordered his men to put tree bolts on our 
feet so we had to sit for 6 weeks getting only water 
and a handful of flour per day (Wallberg 1912, p. 309).
Wallberg’s toil continued as he attempted to escape a 
second time. When they were captured by Russian 
Cossacks and brought back to camp again, they were 
“tortured nonstop.” Despite this, the diary shows that the 
soldier was concerned with food above all else: “I desired to 
find someone among the population who would be willing 
to give me some extra food in secret” Wallberg 1912, 
p. 309), but there was none to be found.
These accounts of suffering, from those soldiers who 
defended the Scanian territories from a Danish march with 
only a little alcohol to warm their bellies to soldiers who risked 
torture and imprisonment in search of food beg the question: 
what were they fighting for? Sidney Mintz (1996) comments,
It may be relevant that soldiers overseas have not 
only been stripped of almost all the marks of their 
individuality (clothing, jewelry, coiffure), but 
because they are in a remote land, they also feel 
bereft of those material representations of their 
culture that are embodied in architecture and in 
linguistic forms (familiar buildings, signs, 
advertising). Under such circumstances, which can 
The regiment leaders did what they could with the 
supplies they had. At the battle of Helsingborg in 
Denmark in 1710, the army marched on the alcohol in its 
bloodstream, having only three farthings’ worth of 
brennevin that morning, and nothing else (Höglund 1996, 
p. 13). Despite this extreme circumstance, they were able to 
stop the Danish army’s attempt, for the third and final 
time, to reclaim its Scanian lands which had been Swedish 
territory since 1658. Second Lieutenant Robert Petrés 
comments in a diary entry dated December 31, 1708 that 
his men were charged far too much (1 ducat) for a kanna 
(approximately 2.6 litres)6 of brennevin, but the cost was 
split between 12 soldiers (1902, p. 203). As mentioned 
above, alcohol was a necessary thing in the military, from 
our earliest records. Speaking of Greek and Roman battle 
tactics, Hanson (1989) states that the formal nature of 
Greek battle created a
mounting, relentless tension as troops were 
deployed in sight of each other and yet at the same 
time provided a lull before this store, where soliders 
might have tried to steel their jittery nerves in any 
possible manner. Since Homer, the Greeks had 
recognized that alcohol had some analgesic value 
against wound trauma. Many soliders may have 
been drinking simply too dull the senses in expectation 
of a painful penetration would to come (125).
Alcohol was a necessary expense that day, despite having 
survived the desolation of the Ukraine campaign a few 
weeks before or perhaps because of it. The brennevin may 
have been a salve to any hurts or “jittery nerves” they may 
have been suffering in the aftermath.
It is not uncommon to see degradation of soldiers’ food 
supply and diet as a war goes on, especially in pre-modern 
times. Even today’s militaries, with the advantages of 
pre-packaged food and speedy distribution, can have 
trouble keeping soldiers well-fed in the field. A 1995 US 
military study showed that there was still “an energy deficit 
of 500 to 2,000 kcal/d and resultant weight loss for the 
study participants” in the field (Marriott 1995, p. 10), but 
that augmenting their rations with frequent snacks and hot 
meals could help them to maintain weight. The difference 
here is that the United States has the ability to feed its 
soldiers consistently enough that this small weight loss is 
manageable. For the Swedish army, loss of rations could 
mean death for the men. About 150,000 Swedish perished 
in the Great Northern War; 25,000 in combat and 125,000 
more due to famine, sickness and exhaustion (Wolke 2004).
Snack foods and regularly scheduled hot meals were a 
distant memory to many Carolean regiments in the field. 
When food supplies were low, they ate what they could cull 
from their rations, and when that failed they ate whatever 
they could find on the land. Described by Andrea Maraschi 
as a “hierarchy of desperation,”7 the end result of such a 
hierarchy could be grim indeed. Historically, there are many 
examples of a fighting force being driven to eat their support 
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much has already been done with more modern conflicts 
such as the World Wars period, but it would be interesting to 
see what interpretations might be made with older conflicts 
across cultures. As Sidney Mintz (1996) mentions, there is 
still much to be done with questions of large-scale structural 
changes to society and culture (e.g. war, migration) and how 
they cause people to “reorder their categories of meaning in 
new ways, and to eat (and drink) differently” (pp. 30–1). By 
examining the military engagement through the lens of food 
choices and supply we may discover more within these 
categories of meaning in our foodways and how they are 
manipulated by those whom Mintz calls “the purveyors of 
the foods” (1996, p. 31) who make foods available to be 
reinterpreted by the public. In trying to understand the 
deeper meaning of food and power in war, we enhance our 
understanding of food history as a whole.
With this, it is possible to suggest that, according to a 
long tradition of military and civilian use, the bread the 
soldiers ate was both practical, portable, nourishing and an 
emblem of home and, in essence, what the soldiers were 
fighting for. Alcohol represented civilization, encouraged 
soldiers when there was little else and provided much-
needed hydration; moreover, it represented a surcease of the 
pain and psychological strain of warfare. The rest of the 
rations provided essential energy in the field. Sweden’s 
adoption of the allotment system before the Great 
Northern War showed an interest in improving supply 
chains and access for soldiers to essential rations, as well as 
forming a more communal system by which soldiers would 
be available for the army, rather than the heavy burden 
which conscription had placed on the people in the past. 
Unfortunately, the optimism and early successes of the war, 
exemplified by the incredible victory at Narva, was not to 
last. As diaries and other evidence shows, on subsequent 
campaigns, soldiers were frequently without rations or 
essential supplies and instead had to forage or beg for food. 
Much like the way soldiers in World War II viewed 
Coca-Cola, it must have been that the bread or brennevin 
they were given that came to represent home and country, 
something to keep a man going when survival was not 
certain; in fact, the ability to eat a soldier’s ration without 
indigestion could easily mark one as an insider, one who 
belongs to the group. The fact that many more Carolean 
soldiers and civilians died from malnourishment and poor 
health than died in combat is a clear indication of Sweden’s 
inability to leverage the power of its resources, so carefully 
selected and arranged in peacetime to produce a large, 
efficient, well-fed military, into a victory against the 
Russians, who overwhelmed with patience through the 
long cold winters, burning the landscape, and attacking 
supply wagons so that no food could be found.
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be alienating, objects that can “carry” a displaced 
sense of culture, such as foods and beverages, take 
on an additional potential power (p. 27).
The food itself, in the absence of all other familiar 
markings of home and country, could represent the 
quintessential national experience to a soldier on the move. 
In addition, native soldiers’ ability to stomach the rations 
could mark them as one of Sweden’s own. Notes from a 
regiment raised in 1707 through enlistment of Saxon 
prisoners of war comment that the new recruits struggled 
with the unfamiliar food, which was often dried and 
heavily salted, causing high rates of sickness and death 
(Höglund 1996, p. 50). Other armies suffered this as well, 
as original recruits perished and more men had to be 
brought in from foreign lands. On the subject of conscripts 
from Norway brought into the Danish army — one of 
Sweden’s enemies in the Great Northern War — “Their 
eating habits surprised somewhat though. Their standard 
bread was made from oat and water, so initially their 
stomachs had trouble with the sourdough bread of the 
Danish army, but if they only survived that, they became 
good soldiers” (Höglund, Sallnäs and Bespalov 2006, 
p. 117). Claude Fischler (1988) states that,
[f]ood is central to our sense of identity. The way 
any given human group eats helps assert its 
diversity, hierarchy and organization, and at the 
same time, both its oneness and the otherness of 
whoever eats differently. Food is also central to 
individual identity, in that any given individual is 
constructed, biologically, psychologically and socially 
by the food he/she chooses to incorporate (275).
With this in mind, we can see then how the otherness of 
a soldier who cannot stomach the chosen rations for a given 
group would mark himself both as outside his normal 
milieu but also biologically different from his peers on an 
individual level. In another way, those in power who make 
decisions regarding feeding the group, such as General 
Major Lagercrona who allowed the familiar tastes of 
brennevin and tobacco to be distributed to the men despite 
the difficult loss of reinforcements and supplies in the fall 
of 1708 identified themselves as leaders in the groups 
hierarchy, with the authority to give out food and to 
provide whatever relief these items could offer. This marked 
them all as one, making the best of a difficult situation by 
partaking together.
Conclusions
Though this research is brief and only compares a few 
primary sources in the form of diaries from the Great 
Northern War, the topic could easily be expanded to include 
other materials, other conflicts or similar comparisons 
between other nations and their treatment of military 
rations and supply. Military history is a growing field, and 
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morale and discipline instilled by chaplains contributed 
to the Swedish victories.” (p. 213). If army commanders 
knew a battle was coming, soldiers were encouraged to 
partake of the Communion; otherwise, regimental 
prayers with hymns and prayer occurred twice per day, 
while services held three times per week included a 
sermon (Gudmundsson 2014, p. 214).
10. Leviticus 11 covers acceptable food, and warns against 
eating horses because they have split hooves but do not 
chew cud. Likewise, dogs and other animals were 
forbidden because they walk on their paws on the 
ground and are thus unclean. Medieval penitentials 
discuss common transgressions such as the eating of 
“unclean” foods and the proper penance for them; 
Bonnassie 1989 compares Libri Paenitentiales and the 
Chroniques and Annales to identify seven categories of 
food prohibition, ranging from touching to partially 
eating to knowingly eating the “unclean” animals.
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Logistik für die militärische Fürung von der Antike bis 
in die neueste Zeit, Bonn: Militärgeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt.
Keegan, J (1978).. The face of battle. London: Penguin Books.
Keep, J.L.H (1985). Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society 
in Russia 1462–1874, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lindegren, J (1980). Utskrivning och utsugning: 
Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeå 1620–1640, 
Lund: Almqvist & Wiksell international.
Luard, E (1992). The Balance of Power: The System of 
International Relations, 1648–1815, New York: Palgrave.
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